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 And then there were four: A study of UK audit market concentration 
– causes, consequences and the scope for market adjustment 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
While concentration measures are a good indicator of market structure, the link with 
competitiveness is more complex than often assumed.  In particular, the modern 
theory of industrial organisation makes no clear statement regarding the impact of 
concentration on competition – the focus of this paper is concentration and no 
inferences are made about competitive aspects of the market.  The extent and nature 
of concentration within the UK listed company audit market  as at April 2002 and, pro 
forma, after the collapse of Andersens is documented and analysed in detail (by firm, 
market segment and industry sector).  The largest four firms held 90% of the market 
(based on audit fees) in 2002, rising to 96% with the demise of Andersens.  A single 
firm, PricewaterhouseCoopers,  held 70% or more of the share of six out of 38 
industry sectors, with  a share of 50% up to 70% in a further seven sectors.  The 
provision of non-audit services (NAS) by incumbent auditors is also considered.   As 
at April 2002 the average ratio of non-audit fees (paid to auditor) to audit fees was 
208%, and exceeded 300% in seven sectors.  It is likely, however, that recent 
disposals by firms of their management consultancy and outsource firms, combined 
with the impact of the Smith Report on audit committees will serve to reduce these 
ratios.  Another finding is that audit firms with expertise in a particular sector 
appeared to earn significantly higher non-audit fees from their audit clients in that 
sector.  The paper thus provides a solid empirical basis for debate.  The subsequent 
discussion considers the implications for companies and audit firms of the high level 
of concentration in the current regulatory climate, where no direct regulatory 
intervention is planned. 
Keywords: auditor concentration; concentration ratios; audit firm mergers 
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– causes, consequences and the scope for market adjustment 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The last fifteen years have seen the emergence of a dominant Big Eight in the audit 
market and the subsequent reduction of this group, through merger and firm collapse, 
to a Big Four.1  This group now audits all the FTSE 100 companies in the UK and 
most other listed companies employ a Big Four firm.  The Office of Fair Trading 
(OFT) found no evidence of anti-competitive behaviour in the UK audit market in a 
very recent inquiry.  Despite this, the high level of market concentration is of concern 
in the UK, as evidenced by the recommendations of the Coordinating Group on Audit 
and Accounting and the Treasury Committee in their post-Enron reviews.2 However 
the final report of the CGAA3 supports the view of the OFT that there is no case for 
an immediate Competition Commission referral or market referral but that the OFT 
should keep the market under review.  In the US, the hastily enacted Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act of July 2002 requires the US Comptroller General to study the factors that have 
led to audit market concentration.  These concerns regarding the current level of 
concentration are heightened by fears that the size of the dominant group could reduce 
further.  
 
The UK government’s basic position is that competitive markets, characterised by 
many competitors and low barriers to entry, are the main drivers of productivity, 
efficiency, product development, accurate pricing and choice for the consumer.  The 
competitive process, which may be characterised by concentration, barriers to entry 
and collusion, is influenced by supply and demand factors, such as costs, incentives, 
switching costs and information.  This process, in turn, influences the nature of 
market outcomes, such as price and choice.  In competition assessment, market share 
is used as an indicator of the existing level of competition in a market.4  Many 
academic studies of auditor concentration explicitly offer as motivation the link 
between market concentration and excessive market power.5
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 It must be said that concerns about the anti-competitive implications of rising levels of 
concentration are not new.  There has always been a widespread belief that rising 
concentration leads to anti-competitive behaviour, encouraging tacit or explicit cartel-
like agreements among the major providers.  Yet, paradoxically, during the early 
1990s there were concerns that the large firms were competing too aggressively.6  It 
was widely believed that excessive price competition resulted in ‘low-balling’ 
behaviour and cross-subsidisation against non-audit services.  In addition, companies 
perceived a willingness on the part of audit firms to offer different accounting 
interpretations and this encouraged ‘opinion-shopping’ behaviour by companies.  
Although no clear evidence exists to support these beliefs and perceptions, ethical 
guidance on both matters was issued by the Chartered Accountants Joint Ethics 
Committee.7  It is, therefore, ironic that the two mega-mergers that produced the Big 
Six in 1989 were a market response to intense competitive pressures.   
 
The most recent reduction in the dominant group, however, arose because of the 
accounting and auditing scandal associated with Enron.  Their auditors, Andersens, 
suffered reputation loss on such a scale that the firm was unable to continue.8  This 
event introduced a shock to the system, destabilising the prevailing market 
‘equilibrium’. It is argued by some that a consequence of this and other recent 
accounting scandals has been a marked reduction in audit fee pressures. Companies 
are no longer pressing for low fees, recognising the need for high quality audit to 
restore confidence in audited accounts.9  After a long period of stagnation and even 
decline in the level of real audit fees in the UK, the US and elsewhere, a widespread 
step change in audit fees appears to be occurring, at least in the US. The situation in 
the UK is less clear, as the incidence of audit tendering is increasing and there are no 
regulatory driven requirements for additional work in relation to corporate 
governance. 
 
Unfortunately, the debate surrounding these issues is largely based on untested 
assumptions and anecdotal evidence.  The purpose of the present paper is to provide a 
more solid empirical foundation for the debate.  It first reviews the available literature 
regarding the causes and consequences of audit market concentration, drawing, in 
particular, upon the modern theory of industrial organisation.  Second, it provides 
systematic empirical evidence on the extent and nature of concentration in the UK 
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 listed company audit market.  In particular, the recent trend in concentration and its 
level as at April 2002 are reported; this is then disaggregated by firm, by market 
segment and by FTSE industry sector.  The association between non-audit fees paid to 
the auditor and audit fees is also analysed by firm, market segment and industry 
sector.  The subsequent discussion considers how the market itself may adjust to this 
high level of concentration in the absence of direct regulatory action.  
 
PRIOR LITERATURE 
 
Industrial organisation theory 
It is unfortunate that few studies point out the significance of recent developments in 
industrial organisation theory to studies of audit market concentration and 
competition.11  Traditional industrial economics holds that market structure (i.e. the 
numbers of competing firms and their market shares) is a causal determinant of 
market conduct (i.e. the extent and nature of price and non-price competition).  
Market conduct, in turn, determines economic performance, in particular, whether or 
not excess profits are earned through oligopolistic collusion or the exercise of 
monopoly power.  It is belief in this structure-conduct-performance paradigm, in 
Bain’s (1956) traditional formulation, which explains the concerns about rising levels 
of audit market concentration.12  Figure 1, panel A shows these simple linkages.  A 
great deal of merger analysis is still based on the analysis of market structure and 
concentration ratios, perhaps because they are relatively easy to measure.13
 
In recent years, however, industrial economists have moved away from claiming that 
a strict causal relationship exists between concentration and competition.  It is argued 
instead that, in equilibrium, both concentration and performance are jointly 
determined by underlying cost and demand parameters (Figure 1, panel B).14 Under 
this view, the detrimental effects of rising concentration are less clear-cut.15 
Moreover, the ‘new industrial organisation’ economics has brought strategic issues to 
the fore, emphasising the importance of barriers to entry and strategic interactions.16
 
[Figure 1 about here] 
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 The modern industrial organisation literature classifies markets into six broad types.  
Three market types are characterised by high market power and generally ineffective 
competition: monopoly (one firm has 100%); dominant firm (one firm has 40% to 
99%); and tight oligopoly (four firms have over 60%).  The other three market types 
exhibit effective competition: loose oligopoly (four firms have less than 40%), 
monopolistic competition (many competitors each with a slight degree of market 
power) and pure competition (many competitors, none of whom has market power).17
 
Level of concentration in the audit market 
For the audit market, concentration is measured using a variety of metrics, including 
number of clients, audit fees, and (since audit fees are not publicly disclosed in many 
countries) surrogates for audit fees such as client revenues or total assets.18  
Concentration ratios, which report the share of a given number of the largest 
suppliers, are most commonly reported.  Comparisons over time and across countries 
are, however, often difficult due to the different metrics used and the different sub-
markets analysed.  
 
In virtually all studies, the level of concentration has been shown to be rising over 
time.  In the UK, the four-firm concentration ratio (based on number of audits) for all 
domestic listed companies (including the USM/AIM) was reported as 43% in 1987, 
59% in 1991 and 60% in 1995.19
 
Causes of change in concentration 
Changes in market concentration occur for three main reasons: voluntary 
realignments; changes in the set of consumers; and changes in the set of suppliers.20  
Companies are free to change their auditor, and realignments do take place for a 
variety of reasons.  The six most common reasons given by UK listed companies who 
changed during the early 1990s were: high audit fee; dissatisfaction with audit quality, 
in terms of the auditor’s ability to detect problems; changes in company’s top 
management; need for group auditor rationalisation; need for a Big Six firm; and 
merger/takeover by/with another company.21  If, however, there is an underlying 
preference for the leading suppliers, then these realignments will, ceteris paribus, 
gradually result in rising concentration.  New listings, insolvencies and mergers also 
play a role, although the overall direction of impact is unpredictable.   
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Major increases in concentration can occur when leading suppliers disappear from the 
market, either through merger or demise.  It should be noted, however, that this is not 
necessarily the case.22  Various US studies have, however, predicted ex ante or 
documented ex post an increase in concentration following the Big Eight mergers.23  
It has also been reported that the Big Eight mega-mergers extended the dominance of 
the large firms across ten countries, particularly in the European market.24  
 
Consequences of increasing concentration 
A key issue for debate is the extent to which the mega-mergers of recent times have 
resulted in an increase in market power (reflected in fee levels and audit firm 
profitability), an increase in efficiency, or a combination of the two effects?  In other 
words, what is the effect on competition?  Horizontal mergers tend to increase 
industry concentration in the face of high barriers to entry and clients’ reluctance to 
change supplier.25  This can lead to higher prices.  Alternatively, costs may be reduced 
due to economies of scale and scope, the strategic use of complementary resources, 
etc.  Unfortunately, these are extremely difficult issues to address in a rigorous and 
comprehensive manner and research in this area is difficult.  As one leading industrial 
economist put it, ‘After more than a century of study, [tight oligopoly] continues to 
baffle and fascinate economists.  When a market contains only a few rivals, their 
behavior, prices, profits, and innovation are difficult to predict.’26
 
Several studies examine audit fee trends post-merger.  In the UK, there was no 
significant increase in audit fees post the 1989 mega-mergers, which might be 
interpreted as a neutral effect on competition.27  This outcome may, however, have 
been confounded by over-capacity in the market.  One study that set out to explicitly 
examine the effect of accounting firm mergers on competition in the market for 
accounting services examined audit firm performance, based on revenue per 
employee, pre- and post-mergers.28  It was found that the performance of large firms 
did not differ significantly from that of small firms in several countries, suggesting 
that high levels of concentration do not necessarily mean low levels of competition.  
Other studies have also concluded that the Big Eight mega-mergers ‘may have had 
little, if any, impact on competition’.29
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 Another study of the 1989 mega-mergers in the US found that the post-merger period 
was characterised by a slight decline in market share for the merged firms compared 
to their close rivals, a decline in audit price for both groups, and a decrease in factor 
costs for the merged firms relative to their close rivals.  This suggests that these 
mergers resulted in increased efficiencies that were passed through to end users in the 
form of lower prices.30 (It is possible that these efficiencies within the audit market 
arose due to over-capacity.  It is, however, also possible that they were offset by 
market power influences in non-audit services (NAS).) 
 
Another potentially important consequence of increasing concentration is on the range 
of supplier choice available.31  One of the obvious effects of the reduction in the 
number of top tier audit firms is the reduced choice available.  It is known that some 
companies have a distinct preference for an auditor who is not associated with their 
competitors.  This becomes particularly problematic in concentrated industries where 
this preference is greater.32
 
Audit market segmentation and industry specialisation  
The market for audit services is recognised to be segmented into distinct sub-markets 
in a hierarchical way.  At the national level, one can distinguish the private (for profit) 
and public (not-for-profit) sectors, with the former split into listed and unlisted 
companies.  The listed company market can be further split based on (i) stock market 
indices (e.g. FTSE 100, FTSE 250, Small, Fledgling) and (ii) industry sector.33  
 
Whether certain types of audit firm seek to specialise in specific stock market sectors 
is largely unknown (although there is casual evidence to indicate that the top tier firms 
attach great importance to the reputation-enhancing aspects of auditing a FTSE 100 
company).  It is, however, widely recognised that the large firms are all specialising in 
particular industries (product lines) to a degree.  They are making huge capital 
investments in people with industry-specific knowledge and in knowledge 
management systems to establish the key performance indicators for that industry.34  
Another driver of industry specialism is mergers and acquisitions activity in a sector, 
since the auditors of the acquirer tend to get the audit of the combined group.  US 
studies have found that concentration levels are highest in regulated industries, in 
more concentrated industries and in industries experiencing rapid growth, but lower in 
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 industries with a high risk of litigation.  They have also found that industry market 
leaders gain market share relative to non-leaders, suggesting that there are returns to 
investing in specialisation.35
 
METHODS 
 
The database used for the present study covers all companies listed on the London 
stock exchange (main market and AIM) and their auditors as at April 2002.36  The 
total number of 2,180 companies includes 545 AIM companies and 459 investment 
trusts. Joint audits were allocated equally to the audit firms concerned. 
 
Market shares are reported using number of audits and audit fees as the activity 
measures.  Since audit fee data was missing for many investment trusts, this sector is 
excluded from some analyses.  While the two measures are very highly correlated, it 
is known that measures based on the number of clients fall below fee-based measures, 
due to the ‘size effect’, whereby large clients tend to employ large audit firms.37  
Concentration ratios and the number of active firms are also reported. 
 
RESULTS 
 
Current level and historical trend in UK concentration 
Auditor concentration in the UK domestic listed company market has been 
documented for at least 35 years.  Figure 2 shows the trend in the four- and eight-firm 
concentration ratios (CR4 and CR8) based on number of audits over this period.  A 
rapid and accelerating increase is apparent.  By 2002, immediately prior to the 
Andersen collapse, CR4 is 66.6% (including AIM companies and investment trusts) 
and CR8 is 85.9%.38  Pro forma figures for 2003, which are calculated on the 
assumption that all Andersens audits are gained by Deloitte & Touche (the acquiror of 
Andersens UK), show a further significant increase in concentration, with the 
remaining four big firms having 72.8% of all audits (up 6.2% from 66.6%).  CR8 rises 
to 88.7%.  It is interesting to note that the pro forma 2003 Big Four share of the AIM 
market is only 43.5%.  The pro forma data must be viewed as indicative only.  It has 
not been possible to establish whether all audit clients transferred to Deloitte & 
Touche.  
7  
  
[Figure 2 about here] 
 
Population data based on audit fees is available for only a relatively short recent 
period.  It has been reported elsewhere that CR4 excluding investment trusts was 
79.4% in 1995.39  The present study shows the corresponding ratio to be 89.6% in 
2002, with a pro forma of 96.3% in 2003.40  The exclusion of the AIM companies is 
unlikely to have a significant impact on these measures, given the relatively low level 
of audit fees in this sub-market.41
 
Another useful supply-side indicator is the number of firms active in a particular 
market sector.  The dramatic decline is shown in the panel at the foot of Figure 2.  In 
the last twelve years, the number of firms doing audits of domestic listed UK 
companies has almost halved, dropping from 166 to just 84. 
 
A more detailed analysis of market shares by individual firm, on the basis of both 
number of audits and audit fees, is shown in Table 1.  This table excludes AIM 
companies and investment trusts. Several observations can be made from this table.  
First, the step change in market share between the ‘Big Boys’ and the rest is now vast.  
On the basis of audit fees earned, the smallest of the four remaining Big Boys now has 
15.6% of the market (Deloitte & Touche and Andersens combined market share is 
19.2%), whereas the closest rival is Binder Hamlyn with a mere 1.0%.  Second, the 
firm with the largest market share, PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC), now has 36.9% of 
the fees in the market.  The audit market, commonly characterised as a tight 
oligopoly, seems to be heading towards what the industrial organisation theorists refer 
to as a ‘dominant firm’ market type, with 40% as the suggested cut-off level.  It must 
be emphasised, however, that the presence of high market share is no longer believed 
by industrial economists to necessarily lead to anti-competitive behaviour. 
 
[Table 1 about here]  
 
Comparison with the US market 
It is interesting to compare UK concentration levels with those in the US.  A recent 
study covering the three main US exchanges (NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ) shows 
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 CR4 based on number of audits to have been 70.4% in 1999, possibly just ahead of 
the corresponding level in the UK at that time.42
 
Concentration by market segment 
An analysis of market shares by market segment, on the basis of audit fees, is shown 
in Table 2.  Each of the main players’ shares is also given.  A clear pattern emerges of 
lessening, but still high, concentration levels outside the premier FTSE indices.  This 
pattern is predictable given the ‘size effect’ discussed above, whereby large 
companies are associated with large audit firms.  It can be noted that in the FTSE 100 
sub-market, PwC’s market share exceeds the 40% threshold (measured in terms of 
both number of audits and audit fees). 
 
[Table 2 about here] 
 
Concentration by industry sector 
The main market population of 1,635 companies (i.e. including investment trusts but 
excluding AIM companies) was classified into 38 industry sectors using the two digit 
sectors from the FTSE Actuaries Industry Classification System  and an analysis of 
market shares by sector, on the basis of audit fees, is shown in Table 3.  The number 
of companies in a sector varies widely from just three (tobacco) to 322 (investment 
companies) (see column 2 of Table 3).  
 
[Table 3 about here] 
 
The Big Five hold 100% share of six sectors and PwC audits all three tobacco 
companies.  Specific firms hold market share of 70% up to 100% as follows: E&Y in 
two sectors (oil and gas; and forestry and paper), KPMG in diversified industrials; and 
PwC in six sectors (steel and other metals; automobiles; tobacco; gas distribution; 
water; and insurance).  Neither Deloitte & Touche nor Andersens (nor even the 
combined firm) achieves this market share in any sector. 
 
Market shares of 50% up to 70% are held by Ernst & Young in one sector (investment 
companies), KPMG in three sectors (aerospace and defence; beverages; and banks) 
and PwC in seven sectors (food producers and processors, personal care and 
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 household products; pharmaceuticals; distributors; general retailers; food and drug 
retailers; and electricity).  Deloitte & Touche/Andersens combined firm achieves this 
level of market share in one sector (information technology hardware). Thus, most 
regulated industries are highly concentrated, consistent with evidence in the US.43  
Below this level of market share, there are many sectors where specialists exist, since 
a market share of only 15% is often taken to indicate specialism.44
 
Associated non-audit service provision 
One of the major debates to have emerged from the Enron scandal concerns the 
provision of non-audit services to audit clients, and the effect that this might have (or 
be seen to have) on auditor independence.45  It is, therefore, of interest to compare the 
ratio of non-audit fees (paid to incumbent auditor) to audit fees for different audit 
firms and across different market segments and sectors. 
 
[Table 4 about here] 
 
The average ratio across the entire listed market as at April 2002 is 208%.  Panel A of 
Table 4 shows how this is skewed towards the top tier firms – the non-Big Five’s ratio 
is only 55%.  Among the Big Five, PwC have the highest ratio (283%) while Deloitte 
& Touche have the lowest (120%).  Panel B shows how the fee ratio varies across 
market segments.  The larger companies in the premier stock market indices have the 
highest ratio – 271% for the FTSE 100 falling to 79% for companies not included in 
any index.  This multiplier effect  associated with audit fees is greatest for FTSE 100 
companies. 
 
Finally, Panel C shows the variation in fee ratio within industry sectors.  Ratios 
exceed 500% for three sectors (food and drug retailers; electricity; and life assurance).  
Ratios lie between 300% and 500% for four sectors (beverages; pharmaceuticals; 
telecommunication services; and gas distribution).  It might be speculated that audit 
firms with expertise in a particular industry sector (large audit market share) would be 
more likely to earn higher NAS fees relative to audit fees from audit clients.  Given 
that these firms are likely to have deeper knowledge in these sectors, it is to be 
expected that they would be among the preferred suppliers.  To investigate this, a 
simple correlation (Pearson coefficient) between fee ratio and sector market share was 
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 calculated based on the pooled sample of 234 audit firm-sector observations (i.e. 6 
audit firms × 38 sectors).  The correlation coefficient was found to be positive and 
highly significant (r = 0.41; p = 0.0001) suggesting that increased sector audit market 
share is associated with a multiplier effect between audit fees and NAS fees from 
audit clients.  
 
It is likely, however, that recent disposals by firms of their management consultancy 
and outsource firms, combined with the impact of the Smith Report on audit 
committees, will serve to reduce these ratios.46  The Smith report requires the audit 
committee ‘to develop and implement policy on the engagement of the external 
auditor to supply non-audit services’. 
 
Discussion 
The results presented above provide a comprehensive view of concentration in the UK 
domestic listed company audit market as at April 2002.  
 
The extant literature provides very little evidence to justify concerns about a lack of 
competitiveness resulting from high levels of concentration in the market.  However, 
in the post-Enron environment, there is emerging evidence that, in the US at least, the 
intense pressure on audit fees has lifted and fees are increasing substantially.  By 
contrast, the amount of NAS purchased from auditors is suggested to be in rapid 
decline in both the US and the UK.47  Although partly due to independence concerns, 
this may also be partly due to the recent disposals by the large firms of their 
consultancy arms.  These changes have the potential to alter the complex dynamic 
between concentration and competition in an unpredictable way.  Forms of 
competitive behaviour (both price and non-price) may change.  
 
However, what is certainly true is that the reduction in the number of active audit 
firms in the market, and especially in the number of top tier firms (now four), does 
reduce consumer choice and increases the likelihood of conflicts of interest.  
Companies may find it increasingly difficult (if not impossible) to identify a top tier 
firm that neither audits nor provides other sensitive services to a major competitor. 
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 We would argue that, even in the absence of evidence that increasing concentration 
has undermined competition in the past, the observed current levels of concentration 
are a legitimate concern.  Changing environmental factors mean that past evidence is 
no longer relevant to the current situation, and reduced choice and conflicts of interest 
may be growing.   
 
So how could this rise in concentration be halted or reversed?  Both demand- and 
supply-side parameters would need to change.  On the demand-side, the pressures to 
have a top tier auditor are known to be intense.48  These pressures arise from real or 
perceived internal needs and from third parties (major shareholders, lenders, bankers 
and regulators).  Until or unless the next tier (the so-called Group A firms) show that 
they are able, at their current organisation size, to undertake more listed company 
audits, they will generally not be acceptable suppliers.  They may, however, pick up 
work which the Big Four cannot undertake because of conflicts of interests. 
 
On the supply-side, one possibility is for some of these Group A firms to merge to 
form a firm that is more comparable in scale to those in the top tier or be a niche 
supplier of specialist services. A clear problem is the huge chasm of scale (and 
possibly scope) that separates the top tier firms from the Group A firms.  A second 
possibility is for the existing top tier firms to demerge or otherwise split into smaller 
organisational units (whether voluntarily or through regulatory intervention).  Audits 
are to some extent divisible, even although joints audits are becoming something of a 
rarity.   
 
However, it is debatable whether any of these demand- and supply-side changes are 
possible in practical terms, given the truly global nature of the market and the high 
barriers to entry.  Regulators could, of course, introduce rotation or heavily restrict 
NAS, but they do not currently appear inclined to do so as a concentration 
intervention strategy.  
 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
This study provides a detailed analysis of the extent of concentration in the UK listed 
company market immediately prior to Andersens’ demise and, on a pro forma basis, 
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 the situation in 2003 where only four main players remain.  The remaining four firms 
hold 96% of the market (based on audit fees), with a single firm (PwC) holding 37% 
of the market.  Levels of concentration are significantly higher in the premier market 
segments and certain industry sectors.  The multiplier effect between audit fees and 
NAS fees from audit clients is greatest among FTSE 100 companies and certain 
industry sectors, while a large sector market share appears to increase the magnitude 
of this association. 
 
The impact of such high levels of concentration on competition (i.e. the degree of 
market power and efficiency levels) is difficult to predict, although there is little 
evidence to suggest that previous increases in concentration have reduced 
competitiveness in the market.  However, the environmental context is changing 
dramatically – NAS provision to audit clients is falling and this may significantly 
affect the dynamic between concentration and competition.  Moreover, the reduced 
purchaser choice, exacerbated by conflicts of interest and high barriers to entry to the 
global market, is problematic. 
 
Four possible market adjustments are considered, although these may be problematic 
in view of the global nature of the audit market.  One demand-side possibility is a 
change in the attitudes of companies and interested third parties regarding the 
capability and acceptability of the Group A firms.  Supply-side possibilities involve 
radical organisational change – the merger of group A firms and/or the demerger of 
the four remaining main players.  The fourth possibility is for direct regulatory 
intervention but the case for this has not been accepted by the OFT or the government.  
The UK market could also be influenced in the event of regulatory intervention in the 
US following the findings of the US Comptroller General’s study into US market 
concentration.  
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 Figure 1: The Structure-Conduct-Performance Paradigm of Industrial 
Economics 
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 Figure 2: Trend in Concentration in the UK Domestic Listed Company Audit 
Market 
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Key: -♦- CR4 based on number of audits (includes AIM companies and 
investment trusts) 
 -■- CR8 based on number of audits (includes AIM companies and 
investment trusts) 
 -○- CR4 based on audit fees (excludes AIM companies and 
investment trusts) 
 
* This figure excludes investment trusts. 
 
Note to figure: Data for 2002 and 2003 (pro forma) are derived using the dataset in 
the present study. Historical trend data are taken from prior empirical studies.49  
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Table 1  Auditor market share by individual firm: 2002
Auditor
Rank Rank
PricewaterhouseCoopers 1 36.9% 1 27.0%
KPMG 2 24.6% 2 20.7%
Ernst & Young 3 15.6% 4 12.9%
Deloitte & Touche 4 12.5% 3 13.1%
Andersen 5 6.7% 5 8.8%
Deloitte & Touche/Andersen 3 19.2% 2 22.0%
Total 'Big 5' 96.3% 82.6%
BDO Stoy Hayward 6 1.0% 7 3.4%
Grant Thornton 7 0.8% 6 3.6%
Baker Tilly 8 0.4% 8 2.0%
Robson Rhodes 9 0.3% 9 1.7%
Moore Stephens 10 0.2% 12 0.4%
PKF 11 0.2% 10 0.9%
Hacker Young 12 0.1% 13 0.3%
Horwath Clark Whitehill 13 0.1% 11 0.6%
Haysmacintyre 14 0.0% 14= 0.3%
Chantrey Vellacott 15 0.0% 14= 0.3%
Others 0.7% 4.0%
Total 'Non-Big 5' 3.7% 17.4%
Total: 57 100% 57 100%
Total audit fees (£m) 436.6
Number of companies 1168 1176
Data used is all listed companies at April 2002 excluding investment companies and AIM companies
All auditors with 3 or more audits in 2002 are listed
For 2002, there were 42 'other' auditors, each having 2 audits or less, undertaking a total of 47 audits
Market share based on 
Audit fees No of audits
  
Table 2  Main players' audit market share (based on audit fees) by market segment: 2002
100 250 Small Fledgling Not Eligible ALL
PricewaterhouseCoopers 42.0% 32.7% 30.4% 28.7% 35.5% 36.9%
KPMG 25.4% 24.4% 27.9% 20.0% 17.0% 24.6%
Ernst & Young 16.9% 13.6% 10.9% 13.0% 27.0% 15.6%
Deloitte & Touche 11.5% 15.7% 11.6% 11.6% 11.5% 12.5%
Andersen 4.3% 11.4% 9.9% 6.8% 1.0% 6.7%
Deloitte & Touche/Andersen 15.8% 27.1% 21.6% 18.4% 12.5% 19.2%
Total 'Big 5' 100.0% 97.8% 90.8% 80.1% 91.9% 96.3%
Others 0.0% 2.2% 9.2% 19.9% 8.1% 3.7%
Total audit fees (£m) 221.9 102.2 52.6 37.4 22.5 436.6
No of observations 99 215 284 470 100 1168
Data used is all listed companies at April 2002 excluding investment companies and AIM companies
The category 'Not eligible' represents companies that are not eligible for inclusion in the FTSE indices
These are usually registered overseas (primarily in Ireland) and cover the whole size spectrum
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Table 3  Main players' audit market share (based on audit fees) by industry sector: 2002
Sector No of cos A D&T D&T/A E&Y KPMG PwC Big5
Resources
Mining 18 0% 48% 49% 2% 15% 33% 99%
Oil & Gas 28 3% 0% 3% 84% 2% 10% 99%
Basic Industries
Chemicals 16 13% 0% 13% 1% 49% 34% 97%
Construction & Building Materials 75 6% 7% 13% 20% 29% 34% 96%
Forestry & Paper 4 0% 0% 0% 74% 24% 2% 100%
Steel & Other Metals 7 2% 3% 5% 0% 0% 94% 99%
General Industrials
Aerospace & Defence 12 1% 5% 7% 1% 55% 37% 100%
Diversified Industrials 3 0% 0% 0% 0% 84% 0% 84%
Electronic & Electrical Equipment 42 10% 3% 13% 41% 14% 15% 84%
Engineering & Machinery 62 12% 19% 30% 13% 31% 22% 96%
Cyclical Consumer Goods
Automobiles 9 12% 2% 14% 0% 14% 72% 99%
Housing Goods & Textiles 48 4% 32% 36% 11% 10% 35% 92%
Non-cyclical Consumer Goods
Beverages 10 2% 0% 2% 15% 56% 25% 98%
Food Producers & Processors 41 11% 6% 16% 4% 17% 61% 99%
Health 31 12% 18% 30% 16% 8% 44% 99%
Personal Care & Household Prods 6 0% 13% 13% 2% 14% 67% 96%
Pharmaceuticals 35 5% 0% 5% 5% 26% 62% 99%
Tobacco 3 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 100% 100%
Cyclical Services
Distributors 12 7% 10% 17% 9% 8% 59% 93%
General Retailers 68 7% 9% 16% 5% 15% 55% 91%
Leisure, Entertainment & Hotels 70 12% 3% 14% 35% 19% 22% 90%
Media & Photography 72 20% 12% 32% 12% 12% 41% 97%
Support Services 102 3% 23% 26% 15% 23% 30% 95%
Transport 39 15% 12% 27% 28% 17% 22% 94%
Non-cyclical Services
Food & Drug Retailers 18 8% 2% 10% 30% 6% 50% 96%
Telecommunication Services 18 1% 28% 29% 1% 30% 37% 98%
Electricity 9 1% 0% 1% 4% 29% 67% 100%
Gas Distribution 3 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 95% 95%
Water 8 0% 0% 0% 13% 15% 70% 98%
Financials
Banks 16 0% 19% 19% 1% 55% 26% 100%
Insurance 19 0% 9% 9% 4% 10% 74% 97%
Life Assurance 8 0% 0% 0% 23% 46% 31% 100%
Investment Companies 322 4% 4% 8% 53% 5% 28% 94%
Real Estate 65 12% 17% 29% 7% 21% 33% 90%
Speciality & Other Finance 62 12% 16% 28% 5% 20% 39% 92%
Other investment companies 137 0% 27% 27% 13% 23% 18% 81%
Information Technology
Information Technology Hardware 30 8% 43% 51% 22% 2% 12% 87%
Software & Computer Services 107 13% 19% 32% 17% 18% 26% 94%
Total number of companies 1635
Data used is all listed companies at April 2002 excluding AIM companies
Market shares of 50% or greater are highlighted in bold
Other investment companies represents venture capital and simliar trusts, all non-eligible for inclusion in FTSE indices
18  
 Table 4 Analysis of non-audit fees paid to auditors: 2002
Panel A: By audit firm Panel C: By industry sector
Auditor Fee ratio Industry Sector Fee ratio
Resources
PricewaterhouseCoopers 283% Mining 148%
KPMG 210% Oil & Gas 190%
Andersen 196% Basic Industries
Deloitte & Touche 120% Chemicals 148%
Deloitte & Touche/Andersen 146% Construction & Building Materials 99%
Ernst & Young 142% Forestry & Paper 19%
Total 'Big 5' 214% Steel & Other Metals 99%
General Industrials
Others 55% Aerospace & Defence 247%
Diversified Industrials 30%
Total 208% Electronic & Electrical Equipment 142%
Engineering & Machinery 88%
Cyclical Consumer Goods
Automobiles 75%
Housing Goods & Textiles 100%
Non-cyclical Consumer Goods
Beverages 311%
Food Producers & Processors 224%
Health 106%
Personal Care & Household Prods 94%
100 100 271% Pharmaceuticals 338%
250 250 174% Tobacco 125%
Small 368 129% Cyclical Services
Fledgling 626 116% Distributors 100%
Not Eligible 291 79% General Retailers 198%
Leisure, Entertainment & Hotels 205%
ALL 1635 208% Media & Photography 284%
Support Services 142%
Transport 238%
Non-cyclical Services
Food & Drug Retailers 547%
Telecommunication Services 395%
Electricity 672%
Gas Distribution 411%
Water 91%
Financials
Banks 232%
Insurance 176%
Life Assurance 511%
Investment Companies 84%
Real Estate 169%
Speciality & Other Finance 110%
Other investment companies 68%
Information Technology
Information Technology Hardware 239%
Software & Computer Services 135%
Data used is all listed companies at April 2002 excluding AIM companies
Fee ratio = total non-audit fees/audit fees
In Panel C, sector fee ratios of greater than 300% are highlighted in bold
Panel B: By market segment
Segment No of cos Fee ratio
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